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propriedade intelectual
THE COMPETING OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING
THE PROTECTION OF INTANGIBLE CULTURAL
HERITAGE

Peter K. Yu463

INTRODUCTION
The protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge (TK) and
traditional cultural expressions (TCE) is of great importance to agricultural
production and food security. As the UK Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR Commission) noted in its final report:
Traditional knowledge has played, and still plays, a vital role in the
daily lives of the vast majority of people. Traditional knowledge is
essential to the food security and health of millions of people in the
developing world. … In addition, … the use and continuous development by local farmers of plant varieties and the sharing and diffusion of these varieties and the knowledge associated with them play
an essential role in agricultural systems in developing countries.464

Since its establishment at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in September 2000, the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(IGC) has worked tirelessly to explore ‘the development of an international
legal instrument or instruments for the effective protection of traditional cultural expressions and traditional knowledge, and to address the intellectual
property aspects of access to and benefit-sharing in genetic resources’.465 As
the inaugural issue of this Journal goes into production, the IGC has made
important plans to submit the draft texts of three separate instruments—on
463 Copyright © 2014 Peter K Yu. This article was abridged and adapted from Peter K Yu, ‘Cultural Relics,
Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage’ (2008) 81 Temple L Rev 433.
464 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development
Policy: Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002) 73.
465 WIPO, ‘Traditional Knowledge’ <http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/> accessed 4 May 2014.
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genetic resources, TK and TCE—for consideration by the WIPO General Assembly in September 2014.466
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In addition to the IGC’s draft texts, Switzerland has proposed to amend
the Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty by explicitly enabling
national patent legislation to require the disclosure in patent applications of
TK and genetic resources used in patent-seeking inventions.467 Although the
proposal makes the disclosure requirement optional, that requirement, once
implemented, will enable the disclosed information to become part of international patent applications.468
Within the World Trade Organization (WTO), a group of developing
countries has also advanced a similar proposal, which requires the addition of
Article 29bis to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).469 If adopted, the new provision would create
an obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of origin of biological resources and TK used in patent-seeking inventions. The proposal would
further require patent applicants to disclose their compliance with access and
benefit-sharing requirements under relevant national laws. Although a large
number of developing countries have supported the proposal, the United
States, Japan and South Korea strongly oppose it, claiming that the additional
requirement would destabilize the existing patent system.470
In addition to efforts at WIPO and the WTO, traditional communities,
governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
have advanced many different proposals and models to protect intangible
cultural heritage. Among the new international instruments that have been
adopted outside the intellectual property and international trade regimes
thus far are the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 2001 In466 Catherine Saez, ‘Protection of Folklore Joins TK, GR on Way to WIPO General Assembly’ Intellectual
Property Watch (7 April 2014) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/04/07/protection-of-folklore-joins-tk-gr-on-way-to-wipo-general-assembly/> accessed 4 May 2014.
467 WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, ‘Proposals by Switzer-

land Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge
in Patent Applications’ (PCT/R/WG/5/11 Rev., 2003) 1.
468 Emanuela Arezzo, ‘Struggling around the “Natural” Divide: The Protection of Tangible and Intangible
Indigenous Property’ (2007) 25 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment LJ 367, 381–82.
469 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council), ‘The Relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Checklist of Issues’ (IP/C/W/420,
2004); TRIPS Council, ‘Elements of the Obligation to Disclose the Source and Country of Origin of the Biological Resources and/or Traditional Knowledge Used in an Invention’ (IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, 2004).
470 Arezzo (n 466 above) 387–88; William New, ‘WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks “New
Thinking” on GIs’ Intellectual Property Watch (26 October 2007) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2007/10/26/
wto-biodiversity-amendment-backed-eu-seeks-new-thinking-on-gis/> accessed 4 May 2014.
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ternational Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (under
the auspices of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization), the 2003 UNESCO
Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Taken together, all of these instruments contribute to the emergent establishment of a new international framework for the protection of intangible
cultural heritage.
One topic that has received considerable academic and policy attention concerns the key objectives underlying the establishment of this new
framework. To help us develop a better and deeper understanding, this article
outlines eight most widely documented objectives. While some of these objectives overlap or conflict with each other, others touch on issues that are of
only marginal concern to some constituencies. By focusing on each objective
in turn, this article aims to underscore the divergent, and at times competing,
interests among the many stakeholders involved in the framework.
Although some readers may find the description of all eight underlying objectives somewhat messy, such messiness is rather common in any
negotiations concerning the establishment of a new international framework.
Rather than offering a subjective evaluation of the importance and urgency of
each objective, or combining them to deduce some organizing principles, this
article presents the objectives as they appear in the current policy debate. After all, policymakers, commentators, activists and the public at large are likely
to value these objectives differently. By presenting the objectives together,
this article foreshadows the challenges to achieving international consensus
on the protection of intangible cultural heritage.
It is worth noting that this article does not distinguish between TK and
TCE, even though the former is arguably more important and relevant to agricultural production and food security. There are at least two reasons. First, indigenous peoples and traditional communities embrace a holistic worldview.
They do not make clear distinctions between TK and TCE, and they ‘regard
expressions of their traditional cultures/folklore as inseparable from systems
of traditional knowledge’.471 Second, because the discussions of TK and TCE
are somewhat intertwined, a comprehensive discussion will be needed to fully
understand the competing objectives underlying the protection of intangible
cultural heritage.
471 WIPO, Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore (2005) 8.
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CULTURAL PRIVACY
While globalization, the digital revolution and the increasing commodification of information have enriched the lives of many traditional communities, these factors have equally threatened these communities by allowing for
the instantaneous distribution of knowledge and materials that are sacred or
intended to be kept secret.472 As Angela Riley noted, such unauthorized reproduction and distribution remains ‘one of the biggest problems faced by
indigenous groups today’.473
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From the standpoint of traditional communities, secrecy is important
for both cultural and spiritual purposes. As Tom Greaves explained:
[T]he control of traditional ideas and knowledge … identifies places,
customs and beliefs which, if publicly known, will destroy parts of
a people’s cultural identity. Sometimes it is knowledge entrusted
only to properly prepared religious specialists. Disclosure to other,
unqualified members destroys it. Sometimes it is knowledge shared among all of a society’s members, but not with outsiders. Such
knowledge charters a society’s sense of self; to disclose it loosens
the society’s self-rationale.474

The ability for these peoples to keep ideas and knowledge secret is
therefore very important. As Sarah Harding explained, ‘secrecy is an integral
part of the sacredness of certain objects, stories, songs or rituals, and as such,
instrumental in maintaining a certain social structure within the cultural group.
[It] helps protect rituals and customs from destructive external forces.’475
Although traditional communities underscore the importance of protecting sacred objects and expressions, it has not been easy to distinguish
between what is sacred and what is not. Making such a distinction sometimes
may even be impossible, given the communities’ holistic worldview and lack
of distinction between sacredness and secularity. As the late Darrell Posey
explained:
472 Angela R Riley, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on Rights and Responsibilities’ (2004) 14 Kansas J L & Public Policy 155, 159.
473 ibid 157.
474 Tom Greaves, ‘IPR: A Current Survey’ in Tom Greaves (ed), Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous
Peoples: A Sourcebook (Society for Applied Anthropology 1994) 4.
475 Sarah Harding, ‘Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage’ (1999) 31 Arizona State LJ 291, 314.
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All creation is sacred, and the sacred and secular are inseparable.
Spirituality is the highest form of consciousness, and spiritual consciousness is the highest form of awareness. In this sense a dimension of traditional knowledge is not local knowledge but knowledge
of the universal as expressed in the local. In indigenous and local
cultures, experts exist who are peculiarly aware of the organizing
principles of nature, sometimes described as entities, spirits, or natural law. Thus, knowledge of the environment depends not only
on the relationship between humans and nature but also between the visible world and the invisible spirit world. According to the
Ghanaian writer Kofi Asare Opoku, the distinctive feature of traditional African religion is that it is ‘A way of life, [with] the purpose
of … ordering our relationship with our fellow men and with our
environment, both spiritual and physical. At the root of it is a quest
for harmony between man, the spirit world, nature, and society.’
The unseen is, therefore, as much a part of reality as that which is
seen—the spiritual is as much a part of reality as the material. In
fact, there is a complementary relationship between the two, with
the spiritual being more powerful than the material.476

Even if the materials are not sacred or intended to be kept secret,
it is important that the materials are not used in a way that would offend
traditional communities—as in OutKast’s culturally insensitive performance of
their hit ‘Hey Ya’ during the internationally televised 2004 Grammy Awards
Ceremony477 and the University of Illinois’ use of its fictitious Indian mascot
Chief Illiniwek for more than eight decades.478
Moreover, regardless of whether the communities find the use of
these materials offensive, they may prefer to keep their ideas and knowledge
out of commercial channels. As Erica-Irene Daes, the founding chairperson
and Special Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
noted, ‘In many ways, indigenous peoples challenge the fundamental assumptions of globalization. They do not accept the assumption that humanity will
benefit from the construction of a world culture of consumerism.’479 Indeed,
476 Darrell Addison Posey, ‘Selling Grandma: Commodification of the Sacred through Intellectual Property
Rights’ in Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (eds), Claiming the Stones/Naming the Bones: Cultural Property
and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity (Getty Research Institute 2002) 201.
477 Eireann Brooks, ‘Cultural Imperialism vs. Cultural Protectionism: Hollywood’s Response to UNESCO
Efforts to Promote Cultural Diversity’ (2006) 5 J Intl Business & L 112, 117–18; Angela R Riley, ‘“Straight
Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection’ (2005) 80 Washington L Rev 69,
70–72.
478 Jodi S Cohen, ‘Hail to the Chief—and Farewell’ Chicago Tribune (22 February 2007) C1; Jon Saraceno,
‘Illini’s Chief’s Final Dance Here at Last’ USA Today (21 February 2007) 2C.
479 Erica-Irene Daes, ‘Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) 95 American Society of Intl L
Proceedings 143, 143.
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consumerism may have little meaning to these communities. As she wrote
earlier in her report for the Working Group:

Denis Borges Barbosa & Marcos Wachowicz

Possessing a song, story or medicinal knowledge carries with it certain responsibilities to show respect to and maintain a reciprocal
relationship with the human beings, animals, plants and places with
which the song, story or medicine is connected. For indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of relationships, rather than a bundle
of economic rights. The ‘object’ has no meaning outside of the relationship, whether it is a physical object such as a sacred site or
ceremonial tool, or an intangible such as a song or story. To sell it is
necessarily to bring the relationship to an end.480

Traditional communities may also ‘fear for the well-being of [their
communities] in the face of commercial exploitation, and … worry that the
expropriation of their living culture will cause their imagery to lose its original significance which will lead to a disruption of their practiced religion and
beliefs and a dissolution of their culture’.481 Indeed, as Susan Scafidi pointed
out, ‘A cultural product reduced to the state of a mere commodity by the
destruction of its intangible value is unlikely to be restored to the source community.’482
Thus, it is understandable why commentators have been concerned
about the continuous push for intellectual property rights to protect TK and
TCE. After all, the intellectual property system ‘was largely developed in the
West, and its models are based on a capitalistic philosophy designed to serve
a market economy’, which is quite different from philosophies embraced by
traditional communities.483 It is therefore no surprise that Naomi Roht-Arriaza
expressed concern that, ‘by attempting to manipulate the prevailing Western
paradigm to suit their needs, … indigenous peoples [will] accelerate the very
commodification of knowledge and of living things that many find so objectionable’484
Concerns about the potential loss of heritage also explain why traditional communities are generally sceptical of open access arrangements,
480 Erica-Irene Daes, ‘Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples: Study on the Protection of the Cultural
and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples’ (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28, 1993) [26].
481 Christine Haight Farley, ‘Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the
Answer?’ (1997) 30 Connecticut L Rev 1, 15.
482 Susan Scafidi, Who Owns Culture?: Appropriation and Authenticity in American Law (Rutgers UP
2005) 104.
483 Riley (n 470 above) 159.
484 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities’ (1996) 17 Michigan J Intl L 919, 956.
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such as those relying on the development of a commons. As Michael Brown
pointed out, ‘from the indigenous-rights perspective, the public domain is the
problem, not the solution, because it defines traditional knowledge as a freely
available resource’.485 In fact, the existing push for open access arrangements
often ignores the inequitable conditions and distribution problems in the current socioeconomic system. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder also cautioned that ‘free and open access had the tendency to suggest “a commons
where resources are up for grabs by the most technologically advanced”’.486
Because one’s success in the commons depends on factors like knowledge,
wealth, power, access and ability, an open access approach does not benefit
everybody equally.487 Such an approach may therefore be of limited assistance
to the poor, the backward, the needy and the politically marginalized.
To complicate matters even further, ‘there may not always be consensus within a community … as to what is or is not acceptable use of culturally significant images in works intended for commercial sale’.488 While some
members of the communities may object to any usage for commercial purposes, others would allow the use of some materials at selected times under
certain conditions. Thus, it is important to let the communities determine for
themselves what materials can be used for commercial purposes. In doing so,
the communities could ‘make careful determinations about which events [or
objects] are appropriate for outsiders based on norms of tribal law, allowing
such revenue-generating activities only when they will not infringe on cultural
privacy or religious dictates’.489
In recent years, cultural group leaders, policymakers and commentators have called for greater protection of ‘cultural privacy’—that is, ‘the right
of possessors of a culture—especially possessors of a native culture—to shield
themselves from unwanted scrutiny’.490 Article 12(1) of the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for instance, stipulates:
485 Michael F Brown, Who Owns Native Culture? (Harvard UP 2003) 237.
486 Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, ‘The Romance of the Public Domain’ (2004) 92 California L Rev
1331, 1356 fn. 131.
487 ibid 1332.
488 Wayne Shinya, Protecting Traditional Cultural Expressions: Policy Issues and Considerations from a
Copyright Perspective (Department of Canadian Heritage 2004) 35.
489 Kristen A Carpenter, Sonia K Katyal and Angela R Riley, ‘In Defense of Property’ (2009) 118 Yale LJ 1022,
1084.
490 Brown (n 483 above) 27–28.
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Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to
their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of
their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their
human remains.

Likewise, Professor Brown reminded us that ‘[a] right to cultural privacy is presented as self-evident and morally unassailable, even if its scope
remains unspecified’.491

Denis Borges Barbosa & Marcos Wachowicz

AUTHENTICITY
The second objective concerns the authenticity of the protected materials. If the contributions of traditional communities are to be recognized,
these materials need to be authentic. Unfortunately, as shown in many reproductions of Maya steles, Aboriginal crafts and Native American rugs, nontraditional producers and copycats usually have very limited understanding of
the culture that the works embody. In the end, they produce materials that
not only free-ride on the efforts and contributions of traditional communities,
but fail to make sense to those communities or researchers who study their
culture.
For example, ‘Aboriginal Australian artists, writers and actors complained that non-Aboriginals were taking the initiative in utilizing Aboriginal
motifs and themes, often resulting in misinterpretations and negative stereotypes’.492 They have also been concerned about ‘the utilisation of reproductions of traditional Aboriginal designs as a means of decorating a host of mundane products primarily developed for the tourist trade, such as tea-towels,
pencil cases, key rings, tee-shirts[,] … drink coasters[,] … wall hangings, carpets
and posters’.493 Furthermore, ‘in Peru, local workers manufacture and sell replicas of golden artifacts symbolizing Incan culture with no remembrance or
connection to the heritage that created such artifacts’.494 Most disturbing of
all, some ‘ingenious people set up a town named “Zuni” in the Philippines,
then stamped goods with the label “Made in Zuni”’.495
491 ibid 28.
492 Daes (n 478 above) [68].
493 Michael Blakeney, ‘Protecting Expressions of Australian Aboriginal Folklore under Copyright Law’
(1995) 17 EIPR 442, 442.
494 Doris Estelle Long, ‘The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property
Perspective’ (1998) 23 North Carolina J Intl L & Commercial Regulation 229, 243.
495 J Michael Finger, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in J Michael Finger and Philip Schuler (eds), Poor People’s Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries (OUP 2004) 17.
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While traditional communities have sought courts’ assistance in enjoining others from making unauthorized reproduction of their materials, their
cease-and-desist demands are not always fruitful. For instance, in the case of
the Australian aborigines, ‘after Australian tee-shirt companies were sued for
infringing the copyright of Aboriginal artists, they began to print shirts with
fake designs. “Most tourists shops [therefore] … are replete with examples of
T-shirt designs which may appear to be works of Aboriginal art but are in fact
caricatures of Aboriginal art.”’496 The resulting misrepresentation and distortion have caused significant economic and psychological injuries to traditional communities. As Michael Blakeney noted, ‘the unauthorised reproduction
of designs which are of significance to Aboriginal religious beliefs and cultural identity is as damaging as the desecration, through mining, of traditional
dreaming places’.497
To reduce abuse and unauthorized copying, trademarks—in particular,
certification marks—have been used to ensure the authenticity and appropriate use of traditional materials.498 Moral rights provide additional protection
against ‘debasement, mutilation or destruction’ of traditional expressions.499
Because ‘the absence of an authenticity mark [or proper attribution] would
alert potential consumers of cultural products to a lack of association with the
presumed source community’,500 these different forms of rights may enable
traditional communities to share in the benefits of their intangible cultural
heritage and obtain appropriate recognition for their creative contributions.
Although expectations for authenticity usually result in greater control by traditional communities and more deference to them, such expectations sometimes may backfire on the communities by making it more diﬃcult
496 Brown 2(n Concerns about the potential loss of heritage also explain why traditional communities are
generally sceptical of open access arrangements, such as those relying on the development of a commons.
As Michael Brown pointed out, ‘from the indigenous-rights perspective, the public domain is the problem,
not the solution, because it defines traditional knowledge as a freely available resource’. In fact, the existing
push for open access arrangements often ignores the inequitable conditions and distribution problems in
the current socioeconomic system. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder also cautioned that ‘free and
open access had the tendency to suggest “a commons where resources are up for grabs by the most technologically advanced”’. Because one’s success in the commons depends on factors like knowledge, wealth,
power, access and ability, an open access approach does not benefit everybody equally. Such an approach
may therefore be of limited assistance to the poor, the backward, the needy and the politically marginalized. above) 89.
497 Blakeney (n 491 above) 442.
498 Maui Solomon, ‘Protecting Maori Heritage in New Zealand’ in Hoffman (above) 355; Wend B Wendland, ‘Intellectual Property and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions’ in Barbara T Hoffman (ed), Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice (CUP 2006) 333.
499 Kamal Puri, ‘Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo: Putting Ideas into Action’
(1995) 9 Intellectual Property J 293, 332.
500 Scafidi (n 480 above) 66.
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for them to demand the return of those cultural artifacts that are already
taken from the communities without their authorization. For example, a museum can use authenticity as a justification to reject demands by indigenous
communities to rebury human remains residing in the museum.501
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RECOGNITION
An objective that goes hand in hand with the protection of authenticity interests is the recognition of the contributions traditional communities
have made over the centuries. Such recognition can be achieved through the
introduction of greater control of their intangible cultural heritage, which in
turn would enable the communities to share in the benefits of the exploitation of such heritage. The traditional communities’ intangible cultural heritage
can also be recognized through a requirement to disclose the origins of the
traditional materials used in new creations or inventions. Proposals that seek
to introduce a disclosure requirement include Switzerland’s recent proposal
to amend the Patent Cooperation Treaty Regulations and a similar proposal
by a group of developing countries to amend the TRIPS Agreement. To some
extent, these requirements resemble those ethical guidelines museums have
used to ensure the proper handling of cultural artifacts.502
By identifying the source of the underlying materials, a disclosure
requirement would help users better understand the origin of the products
while providing recognition to the community responsible for the creation of
those materials. Such a requirement would also enhance the ability of ‘providers of genetic resources and TK to keep track of the use of their tangible
and intangible resources as well as the development resulting in patentable
inventions’.503
If informed consent is further mandated as part of the requirement,
like what is stated in the Article 29bis Proposal, the requirement would further ensure a legitimate exchange between traditional communities and follow-on authors or inventors. Such consent is particularly important when the
invention includes genetic resources from indigenous peoples and traditional
communities. Such a requirement would also ‘increase transparency and help
Developing Countries to monitor actual compliance with the provisions [on
501 Patty Gerstenblith, ‘Cultural Significance and the Kennewick Skeleton: Some Thoughts on the Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes’ in Barkan and Bush (n 474 above) 163.
502 James AR Nafziger, ‘The Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural
Material’ (2007) 8 Chicago J Intl L 147, 151–52.
503 Arezzo (n 466 above) 381.
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access and benefit sharing] set forth in the CBD’.504
Moreover, the disclosure requirement would benefit the public at
large by informing the public of the origin of the underlying materials while at
the same time allowing them to anticipate potential issues that may arise as
a result of such usage. By disclosing in intellectual property applications the
underlying prior art, the requirement would also reduce the chance of privatization of pre-existing TK and genetic resources, both of which will remain in
the public domain and be freely available to the public at large.
The requirement would also help strike a practical compromise that
would allow traditional communities to ensure authenticity, obtain recognition and share in the benefits amidst the rapid commodification of TCE and
continuous and expanding practice of bioprospecting. As Christine Haight Farley wrote:
Assuming that the circulation of indigenous art is inevitable, some
indigenous artists want to be sure to participate in this celebration
of indigenous culture. By gaining control over the circulation of
their imagery, they want to ensure that the public gets an accurate
account of indigenous culture and that the investment in that culture goes back to their communities.505

Nevertheless, disclosure has a major weakness: because of the inherent diﬃculty in determining the source of origin of the underlying materials,
such a requirement may lead to uncertainty and inconsistency and may ultimately reduce incentives for creation and innovation. As Emanuela Arezzo
explained:
Use of genetic resources is rarely recognizable by merely looking
at the final product. Even under a close analysis, indigenous people
would not know that biological resources had been taken without
prior informed consent, not to mention access and benefit sharing;
the same applies for TK. Only when the innovation consists of the
very same use of the plant that is known in the indigenous community is the link between the biological resource and the patent
apparent. Sometimes, however, traditional scientific knowledge
only provides useful leads that ‘bioprospectors’ use for prioritizing
the screening of certain plants. The isolated molecules and compounds of these plants may reveal properties beyond those identified by indigenous communities, or the properties already known
by indigenous communities are studied for new purposes. In the
latter case, the link between TK and the final product gets blurred
504 ibid 379.
505 Farley (n 479 above) 14.
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along the way to the patent oﬃce, and indigenous people are unable to find out about—and hence oppose—biosquatting.506

This diﬃculty is, indeed, one of the main reasons why the United
States and Japan has strongly opposed the disclosure requirement proposals
at both WIPO and the WTO.507 Whether the requirement will be beneficial
will depend on whether the benefits of disclosure exceed its costs. At this
point, making that determination will require further empirical research.

Denis Borges Barbosa & Marcos Wachowicz

Compensation
In addition to recognition and authenticity, some traditional communities want compensation. As this article has shown earlier, the use of traditional materials without their authorization harms the communities in economic, social, cultural, psychological and spiritual terms. As a result, some
communities have demanded compensation for their injuries. Although such
compensation may not fully cover those injuries, it does provide significant
benefits to traditional communities. At the very least, it can promote ‘local
sustenance and adequacy for living’ for these communities.508
As Graham Dutfield reminded us, ‘TK is valuable first and foremost
to indigenous and local communities who depend upon it for their livelihoods
and well-being, as well as for enabling them to sustainably manage and exploit
their local ecosystems such as through sustainable low-input agriculture.’509
Likewise, Professor Brown suggested that we should reframe the question
from ‘Who owns native culture?’ to ‘How can we promote respectful treatment of native cultures and indigenous forms of self-expression within mass
societies?’510
Taking account of the growing demands, Jerome Reichman advanced
a proposal for using liability rules to address problems concerning the protection of TK and subpatentable inventions.511 Under his proposed compensatory
liability regime, second comers will be required ‘to pay equitable compensa506 Arezzo (n 466 above) 379.
507 ibid 387–88.
508 Stephen Gudeman, ‘Sketches, Qualms, and Other Thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights’ in Stephen B Brush and Doreen Stabinsky (eds), Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual
Property Rights (Island Press 1996) 119.
509 Graham Dutfield, ‘Legal and Economic Aspects of Traditional Knowledge’ in Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual
Property Regime (CUP 2005) 505.
510 Brown (n 483 above) 10.
511 JH Reichman, ‘Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation’
(2000) 53 Vanderbilt L Rev 1743, 1776–91.
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tion for borrowed improvements over a relatively short period of time’.512 As
Professor Reichman explained, such an alternative regime has several benefits. For example, it ‘could stimulate investment without chilling follow-on innovation and without creating legal barriers to entry’.513 Such a regime ‘would
also go a long way toward answering hard questions about how to protect
applications of traditional biological and cultural knowledge to industry, questions that are of increasing importance to developing and least-developed
countries’.514
A few years later, Professor Reichman and his colleague, Tracy Lewis,
built on this proposal and called for the use of liability rules to address problems concerning TK protection.515 Their compensatory liability regime would
provide traditional communities with ‘a clear entitlement to prevent wholesale duplication of their compiled information and to reasonable compensation for all follow-on commercial applications of their traditional knowledge
during a specified period of time’.516 The regime provides three distinct rights:
‘[1] a right to prevent wholesale duplication, [2] a right to compensation from
value-adding improvers and [3] a right to make use of a second comer’s value-adding improvements for purposes of making further improvements of his
or her own’.517 Through protection of these rights, the regime ‘would temporarily remove eligible traditional knowledge from the limbo of a true public
domain and relocate it to a semicommons, from which it could freely be accessed and used for specified purposes, in return for the payment of compensatory royalties for a specified period of time’.518
Notwithstanding these proposals, and similar proposals by other policymakers and commentators, compensation can be diﬃcult sometimes. For
instance, as the previous section noted, detecting the use of genetic resources
can be diﬃcult, time consuming and technology intensive.519 Researchers may
also ‘find that a bioactive ingredient has a medical use different from that
suggested by the original collectors’; such varied use ‘is by no means unusual
because traditional plant remedies may be effective within the framework of
512 ibid 1777.
513 ibid 1746.
514 ibid 1747.
515 Jerome H Reichman and Tracy Lewis, ‘Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing
Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge’ in Maskus and Reichman (n 507 above) 348–65.
516 ibid 358–59.
517 ibid 349.
518 ibid 354–55.
519 Arezzo (n 466 above) 379.
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a society’s own understanding and yet fail to satisfy the eﬃcacy standards of
Western medicine’.520
Moreover, some communities would simply consider monetary compensation inadequate. The continuing of cultural knowledge and practices is
important to the survival of the communities,521 and it is hard to quantify
cultural erosion and community loss in monetary terms. As Antony Taubman,
the director of the WTO Intellectual Property Division and the former director
of WIPO Global Intellectual Property Issues Division, pointed out, ‘Where certain uses cause spiritual offence and threaten cultural integrity, … rather than
commercial damage, monetary payment may not be viewed by TK holders
as … an equitable form of compensation.’522 Meanwhile, the survival of the
community is also important to the survival of culture and knowledge.523 If
the community disappears, such important knowledge is also likely to become
extinct.

Denis Borges Barbosa & Marcos Wachowicz

BENEFIT SHARING
A more conciliatory objective is to allow traditional communities
and developing countries to share in the benefits created through the use of
their intangible cultural heritage. Article 8(j) of the CBD, for example, requires
member states to
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the
approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations
and practices.

The Article 29bis Proposal also requires the disclosure of information
concerning the compliance with the CBD’s benefit-sharing requirement.
Taken together, these benefit-sharing arrangements would allow traditional communities to capitalize on what Michael Finger and Philip Schuler
have called ‘poor people’s knowledge’.524 As noted in a study by the Department of Canadian Heritage, the protection of TK and TCE can be seen ‘as part
520 Brown (n 483 above) 111.
521 Daes (n 478 above) [30].
522 Antony Taubman, ‘Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential Diversity in the International Protection of Traditional Knowledge’ in Maskus and Reichman (n 507 above) 532.
523 WIPO, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge (2005) 7.
524 Finger and Schuler (n 493 above).
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of a development strategy’.525 By facilitating the use and further development
of this knowledge and these expressions, the arrangements would also benefit
nontraditional communities and the public at large, especially if the protected
materials can be clearly identified and such protection would not incur significant transaction costs or result in what Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg
described as the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’.526
To maximize benefits from the arrangement, commentators have advocated the use of property or intellectual property rights. By creating artificial scarcity in the form of limited monopolies, similar to what is offered
in the intellectual property system, the exclusive rights model would enable
traditional communities to obtain a higher return on the use and exploitation
of their cultural materials. As Professor Daes reasoned:
A number of distinctively patterned textiles, such as ikat cloth
from Sulawesi and Zapotec rugs from Mexico have obtained large
markets in industrialized countries. These items can easily be reproduced at lower cost on machines, however, and when produced
in large quantities they quickly lose their novelty and commercial
value.527

Notwithstanding these benefits, commentators have questioned
whether such a model would be ideal for the protection of intangible cultural
heritage. For instance, ‘indigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms
of property at all … but in terms of community and individual responsibility.…
For indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of relationships, rather than a
bundle of economic rights.’528 Moreover, as Naomi Mezey noted:
Cultural property is contradictory in the very pairing of its core
concepts. Property is fixed, possessed, controlled by its owner, and
alienable. Culture is none of these things. Thus, cultural property
claims tend to fix culture, which if anything is unfixed, dynamic, and
unstable. They also tend to sanitize culture, which if it is anything
is human and messy, and therefore as ugly as it is beautiful, as destructive as it is creative, as offensive as it is inspiring.529

There is also a general ‘presumption that Western nations prefer
private ownership and source nations or indigenous peoples prefer group or
525 Shinya (n 486 above) 24.
526 Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation,
and Costs Lives (Basic Books 2010) 49–78; Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698.
527 Daes (n 478 above) [61].
528 ibid [26].
529 Naomi Mezey, ‘The Paradoxes of Cultural Property’ (2007) 107 Columbia L Rev 2004, 2005.
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common ownership’.530 However, it is important to remember that not all traditional objects are intended to be communal. As Professor Daes pointed out,
‘although heritage is communal, there is usually an individual who can best
be described as a custodian or caretaker of each song, story, name, medicine,
sacred place and other aspect of a people’s heritage’.531 Moreover, as Michael
Harkin has shown, the ‘masks and ceremonial objects of the Kwakiutl, items
associated with the potlatch ritual, were not communal but intensely personal, having been created for, and owned by, specific individuals’.532 Many of the
songs and dances associated with this potlatch ritual, indeed, ‘are under the
exclusive possession and control of particular individuals’.533 Exclusive possession and control can also be found in ‘some of the songs of the Suya, or the
sacred objects of the Australian Aboriginal people’.534
More recently, Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal and Angela Riley made
a very convincing case about the merits of the property model.535 As they explained, it is not that model per se that creates problems for the protection of
intangible cultural heritage, but rather the undue focus on ownership and the
rights to exclude, develop and transfer that makes the model undesirable.536
To remedy this misguided focus, they articulated a new property model that
is based on a stewardship paradigm. As they explained, such a model would
‘take[] into account indigenous peoples’ collective obligations toward land
and resources’.537
Their proposed model makes a lot of sense. Stewardship has long
been used as a key justification for the protection of intangible cultural heritage. In addition, the property model based on a stewardship paradigm would
not necessarily result in exclusion, alienation and transfer—some of the main
concerns of traditional communities. Nevertheless, even if we embrace this
paradigm, there may still be questions concerning how broadly stewardship
should be defined. As Barry Barclay noted:
Each generation has a part in … stewardship. Having taken a storyteller position, I could show a great range of people who are in530 Harding (n 473 above) 304.
531 Daes (n 478 above) [29].
532 Sarah Harding, ‘Defining Traditional Knowledge—Lessons from Cultural Property’ (2003) 11 Cardozo J
Intl & Comparative L 511, 516.
533 Harding (n 473 above) 306.
534 ibid.
535 Carpenter, Katyal and Riley (n 487 above).
536 ibid 1079–80.
537 ibid 1028.
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volved in this stewardship, from the home gardener, the peasant
farmer and the traditional plant breeder to the international policy
maker; anybody, in fact, who is involved in the stewardship of the
plants humans depend upon for life itself. For my money, that involves, to a greater or lesser extent, each one of us. But while the term
‘stewardship’ provides a useful context within which to place this or
that aspect of our management responsibilities, it does not formally
front up on the tough question: who owns the seed? ‘A private or
public resource?’ Pat Mooney asks.538

In addition to the use of property rights, benefit sharing can be arranged through the use of knowledge transfer and research collaborative
agreements.539 The innovative approach taken by the Instituto Nacional de
Biodiversidad (INBio) in Costa Rica provided a leading example of the successful use of these agreements. The agreements allowed companies like Merck
to collect biological samples in conservatories set up in Costa Rica and conduct research and develop commercial products based on those samples in
exchange for advance payment and royalties in those products.540 As one
commentator observed, since its establishment, INBio ‘has signed more than
20 agreements with industry, … and the total of the research budgets have
come to represent an investment of US$0.5 million per year for bioprospecting activities and US$0.5 million per year for capacity building, technology
transfer and institutional empowerment’.541 Although INBio was widely cited
as a success a decade ago, recent reports have noted the institute’s deep financial crisis.542 It remains to be seen whether this crisis was caused by the
bioprospecting arrangement or other unrelated factors.
In sum, a number of ways exists to allow traditional communities to
share in the benefits of the exploitation of their intangible cultural heritage.
538 Barry Barclay, Mana Tuturu: Maori Treasures and Intellectual Property Rights (U of Hawaii Press 2005)
44–45.
539 On bioprospecting arrangements featuring North-South cooperation, see Djaja Djendoel Soejarto et
al, ‘Bioprospecting Arrangements: Cooperation between the North and the South’ in Anatole Krattiger et al
(eds), Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices (Centre for the Management of Intellectual Property in Health Research and Development and Public
Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture 2007); Carl-Gustaf Thornstrom and Lars Bjork, ‘Access and
Benefit Sharing: Illustrated Procedures for the Collection and Importation of Biological Materials’ in Krattiger et al (above).
540 Rodrigo Gamez, ‘The Link between Biodiversity and Sustainable Development: Lessons from INBio’s
Bioprospecting Programme in Costa Rica’ in Charles R McManis (ed), Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual
Property, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2007) 82–83.
541 ibid 83–84.
542 Edward Hammond, ‘Costa Rica’s INBio, Nearing Collapse, Surrenders Its Biodiversity Collections and
Seeks Government Bailout’ Third World Network Info Service on Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge (20
April 2013) <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/biotk/2013/biotk130401.htm> accessed 4 May 2014.
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Two problems remain, however. First, the establishment of benefit-sharing
arrangements assumes that traditional materials can be freely commodified.
This is not true with respect to materials that are sacred or intended to be
kept secret. Second, and more importantly, there is no guarantee that the
proceeds from the benefit-sharing arrangement will go directly to traditional
communities. Many developing countries remain troubled by rampant corruption and inadequate infrastructure.543 As a result, the revenues that are
generated through the use of intangible cultural heritage may never reach the
hands of traditional communities.
Indeed, commentators have been particularly concerned about the
potential claims on revenues by mediating government agencies. As Tom Greaves wrote, ‘all of the countries with significant indigenous societies have government mediator agencies to deal with them [and serve as the authorized
guardians of their welfare].… Would [the earned revenues] by-pass these intermediate organizations?’544 Likewise, Professor Brown questioned, ‘Who are
legitimate representatives of indigenous peoples in negotiations with foreign
bioprospectors? Can the state speak for them, or must they be allowed to
speak for themselves?’545 To avoid diversion, some companies, like Shaman
Pharmaceuticals, have chosen ‘not … to return royalties directly to source
communities but to a Northern-run NGO that will distribute the proceeds as
it sees fit’.546
To make things even gloomier and more complicated, there is a historical lack of respect and representation for, and participation of, traditional
communities in the political process.547 This is true with respect to communities in both the developed and developing worlds. As Rosemary Coombe
noted:
Although indigenous peoples are now recognized as key actors in
this global dialogue, it will need to be expanded to encompass a
wider range of principles and priorities, which will eventually encompass political commitments to indigenous peoples’ rights of
self-determination. Only when indigenous peoples are full partners
in this dialogue, with full juridical standing and only when … their
cultural world views, customary laws, and ecological practices are
recognized as fundamental contributions to resolving local social
justice concerns will we be engaged in anything we can genuinely
543 Paul J Heald, ‘The Rhetoric of Biopiracy’ (2003) 11 Cardozo J Intl & Comparative L 519, 536.
544 Greaves (n 472 above) 12.
545 Brown (n 483 above) 112.
546 Roht-Arriaza (n 482 above) 961.
547 Scafidi (n 480 above) 56.
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call a dialogue.548

The late Keith Aoki also reminded us that it is not diﬃcult to ‘imagine
situations where the interests of subnational groups, communities or tribes
are at loggerheads with state interests’.549
Notwithstanding these political challenges, it is important not to
overstate the disconnect between national governments and traditional
communities. As Paul Kuruk observed:
Most Africans belong to tribes and have roots in traditional communities, whether they live in villages or cities. The lowest rural
shepherd boy is no more a traditionalist than is the President of the
country living in the state capital. Also, tribal groups are as much
a part of the national government as any group could possibly be.
As such, they are not minority groups fighting for political power.
That central governments in Africa are not threatened politically
may explain why they have readily acknowledged in legislation the
entitlement of traditional groups to their folklore.550

Benedict Kingsbury also found the concept of ‘indigenous people’ somewhat problematic in Southeast Asia, due partly to its colonial history.551
Conservation
The objective to conserve intangible cultural heritage is quite different from some of the other underlying objectives discussed in this article. This
objective benefits not only traditional communities and developing countries,
but also nontraditional communities and developed countries. Preservation
and conservation, indeed, provide the main objectives of the protection for
cultural artifacts. As John Merryman noted:
The essential ingredient of any cultural property policy is that the
object itself be physically preserved. The point is too obvious to
need elaboration; if it is lost or destroyed, the Etruscan sarcophagus or the Peruvian textile or the Chinese pot cannot be studied,
548 Rosemary J Coombe, ‘The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Traditional

Knowledge in International Law’ (2001) 14 St Thomas L Rev 275, 284–85.

549 Keith Aoki, Seed Wars: Controversies and Cases on Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectu-

al Property (Carolina Academic Press 2008) 92.

550 Paul Kuruk, ‘Protecting Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reapprais-

al of the Tensions between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States’ 48
American U L Rev 769, 841 (1999).

551 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Applicability of the International Legal Concept of “Indigenous

Peoples” in Asia’ in Joanne R Bauer and Daniel A Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human
Rights (CUP 1999).
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enjoyed, or used. Everything else depends on the physical survival
of the cultural artifact itself. Indeed, from a certain point of view
the observation is tautological; if we don’t care about its preservation, it isn’t, for us, a cultural object.552
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Thus, many consider cultural artifacts as ‘survivors’.553 As such, they
‘play[] an integral role in characterizing and expressing the shared identity and
essence of a community, a people and a nation. Cultural property tells people
who they are and where they come from.’554 Different people have different
ways to ‘live[] their lives and order[] their values. [Because e]very human society manages to place its unique stamp on its artifacts … [cultural artifacts]
reveal something essential about itself.’555
Like the protection of cultural artifacts, conservation is a very important objective of the protection for intangible cultural heritage. Unlike the protection of tangible objects, however, the conservation of such heritage focuses mainly on the materials—whether they are physical, cultural or biological.
Such conservation does not focus on cultures themselves. As Professor Mezey
reminded us, ‘we humans should save species not because of the interest
each species has in its own survival, but for the sake of diversity and the contribution of each species to a diversified global ecosystem’.556
Commentators have expressed concern about the ecological impact
of increased intellectual property protection. As one commentator noted,
one of the key ecological impacts of the TRIPS Agreement is ‘the spread of
monocultures as corporations with [intellectual property rights] attempt to
maximize returns on investments by increasing market shares’.557 To highlight
the danger of a lack of biodiversity, commentators have retold stories about
‘the Irish potato famine during the 1840s and the Southern Corn Leaf Blight
during the 1970s’.558 Jack Kloppenburg also pointed out that ‘none of the
world’s twenty most important food crops is indigenous to North America or
Australia … [and that] it is clearly the West Central Asiatic and Latin American
regions whose germplasm resources have historically made the largest genet552 John Henry Merryman, ‘The Public Interest in Cultural Property’ (1989) 77 California L Rev

339, 355.

553 ibid 347.
554 Stephanie O Forbes, ‘Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect Cultural Property’
(1996) 9 Transnational Lawyer 235, 241–42.
555 Merryman (n 550 above) 353.
556 Mezey (n 527 above) 2010.
557 Scott Holwick, ‘Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2000) 11 Colorado J Intl Environmental L & Policy (1999 Yearbook) 49, 58.
558 Aoki (n 547 above) 24.
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ic contribution to feeding the world’.559
To date, the developing South possesses far richer biodiversity than
the developed North. As Chidi Oguamanam observed:
The richness of biodiversity in the tropical South can be captured
from few samples. A single leguminous tree in Peru harbours fortythree species of ants, almost the same as the entire ant population
in Great Britain. Costa Rica has an estimated fifteen hundred to two
thousand butterfly species. Britain has about sixty, even though
Costa Rica constitutes less than one-sixth of the British land area.
To physical/zoological geographers and conservation biologists,
the whole of Europe is but a small fragment compared to Asia in
terms of diversity of animal life. All the tree species in North America are equal to just seven hundred species of trees in ten selected
one-hectare plots in Borneo. The Cape Florist Peninsula in South
Africa, which is only 470 square kilometres in area, is home to over
two thousand indigenous species, a greater number than the entire
flora species of Eastern North America. A square-kilometre of the
forests of Central or South America contains a legendary collection
running into hundreds of assorted species.560

Sadly, the international system operates in the opposite direction: the
wealth of a country is usually inversely proportional to the richness of its biodiversity. Because the market offers limited value to traditional materials and
biological resources, the South was unable to convert their biological wealth
to economic development. To add insult to the injury, the biodiversity-poor
countries ‘are now exporting wheat, corn, and rice to the very nations in which
those crops originated’—at high prices at times.561 In view of this inequitable
arrangement, developing countries are now demanding reform that reflects
their contributions and takes account of their local conditions.562 They also
seek greater financial resources from developed countries to help conserve
biological resources.
Fortunately, as Paul Heald suggested, conservation of natural resources may provide common ground for developed and developing countries, traditional and nontraditional communities, and corporations and individuals to
work together. As he explained, ‘preservation is in the direct financial interest
559 Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492–2000
(U of Wisconsin Press 1988) 181.
560 Chidi Oguamanam, International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Plant Biodiversity, and Traditional Medicine (U of Toronto Press 2006) 39–40.
561 Kloppenburg (n 557 above) 274.
562 Peter K Yu, ‘Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime’ (2004) 38
Loyola of Los Angeles L Rev 323, 381–92.
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of some of the most powerful private institutions on the earth—international
pharmaceutical, agribusiness and bio-tech firms—and it is worth convincing
them to support the effort’.563 Indeed, conservation would help create ‘ethnic
externalities’ that may benefit the entire world—both in the cultural and biological sense.564
While conservation benefits all humanity, including both traditional
and nontraditional communities, conservation provides additional benefits to
traditional communities. In some cases, conservation may even be needed to
enable these communities to survive. As the IPR Commission declared in the
public health context:
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Traditional knowledge is essential to the … health of millions of people in the developing world. In many countries, traditional medicines provide the only affordable treatment available to poor people.
In developing countries, up to 80% of the population depend on
traditional medicines to help meet their healthcare needs. In addition, knowledge of the healing properties of plants has been the
source of many modern medicines.565

According to Professor Coombe, ‘most of the worlds’ poorest people depend upon their traditional environmental, agricultural, and medicinal knowledge for their continuing survival, given their marginalization from
market economies and the inability of markets to meet their basic needs of
social reproduction’.566
Access
An objective that is often mentioned along with conservation is access. Access is important to scientific research. The need for access by the
scientific and museum communities, however, has created significant tension
with the interests of traditional communities. A notable example concerns the
discovery of what traditional communities have called the ‘Ancient One’, but
what the popular press and many commentators have dubbed the ‘Kennewick
Man’—a label derived from Kennewick, Washington, the town near which the
skeleton was found.567 As Professor Harding described:
563 Heald (n 541 above) 538.
564 Sarah Harding, ‘Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property’ (1997) 72 Indiana LJ 723,
747.
565 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (n 462 above) 73.
566 Rosemary J Coombe, ‘Protecting Traditional Environmental Knowledge and New Social Movements in
the Americas: Intellectual Property, Human Right, or Claims to an Alternative Form of Sustainable Development?’ (2005) 17 Florida J Intl L 115, 115.
567 Allison M Dussias, ‘Kennewick Man, Kinship, and the “Dying Race”: The Ninth Circuit’s Assimilationist Assault on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act’ (2005) 84 Nebraska L Rev 55,
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In the summer of 1996, two men came across the remains of a human skeleton lying in the Columbia River. After a brief investigation,
a group of anthropologists made two tentative findings. First, the
skeletal remains were that of a Caucasian and could not be assigned to any Native American tribe living in the area. Second, the
skeletal remains were approximately 9000 years old. The age and
location of the remains led the Army Corps of Engineers to assume
they were associated with local Native American tribes and to send
out a notice of intent to repatriate the remains in accordance with
NAGPRA [Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
of 1990]. Numerous tribes in the area subsequently laid claim to the
remains, now known as the Kennewick Man, named after the town
near where he was discovered. At least two of the tribes claiming
the remains, the Umatilla and the Nez Perce, announced that they
would not permit scientific research on the remains prior to reburial. Shortly after the publication of the notice of intent and before
actual repatriation, a group of scientists filed suit in federal district
court claiming, among other things, the right to perform tests on
the remains to determine whether the skeleton is Native American
within the meaning of NAGPRA. The scientists were subsequently
joined in their lawsuit by the Asatru Folk Assembly, a pre-Christian,
European religion, which sought custody of the remains on the basis of the alleged European descent of the remains for the purpose
of scientific study and reburial in accordance with their religious
beliefs.568

After eight years, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finally
decided that the approximately 9,000-year-old remains did not fall within the
scope of NAGPRA.569 Because the remains were not culturally aﬃliated with
any legitimate claimant, the court did not order the remains to be repatriated
and permitted scientific research on the skeleton.
While scientists and archaeologists tend to place higher values on
research and discoveries than cultural privacy and respect,570 it is hard to
ignore the fact that these value-laden decisions tend to privilege the nontraditional worldview over the traditional one. As Rebecca Tsosie pointed out, ‘The
complex world views [to which traditional communities subscribe] … encompass radically different notions of life, death, kinship and cultural continuity,
and suggest that the scientific proof standard is a complete mismatch for Nati131–33; Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 163–67; S Alan Ray, ‘Native American Identity and the Challenge of
Kennewick Man’ (2006) 79 Temple L Rev 89.
568 Harding (n 473 above) 349.
569 Bonnichsen v United States, 367 F.3d 864, 882 (9th Cir 2004).
570 Neil Brodie, ‘An Archaeologist’s View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities’ in Hoffman (n 496
above) 52.
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ve American claims to ancient remains. Science is incapable of demonstrating
what Kennewick Man’s “culture” was.’571 It is therefore no surprise that the
International Society of Ethnobiology stated as one of its guiding principles
that scientists and researchers should have a duty ‘to ensure that their research and activities have minimum impact on local communities’.572 After
all, the controversy surrounding the Ancient One, or the Kennewick Man, is
one ‘about whether the self-definition of a Native American group should be
recognized even when it conflicts with the scientific interests of the dominant
cultural and political group in the United States’.573
The reburial of human remains of indigenous peoples, indeed, has
sparked significant controversies and concerns among the indigenous, scientific and museum communities.574 It has also raised questions about whether
indigenous peoples should be treated differently. With the assistance provided by the NAGPRA, indigenous communities have begun to insist on the return of all the human remains that are still housed in museums or research
institutions.575 As one commentator noted, ‘most of the tribes believe that if
you rob the dead … it disturbs the spirit and visits harm upon not only those
who disturbed the grave, but on the relatives of the dead, who allowed that
to happen’.576 Likewise, Professor Harding reminded us that ‘the Kumeyaay
believe that if the remains of an ancestor are disturbed, the spirit returns from
the afterworld and remains in pain until the remains are again returned to
the earth’.577 By contrast, many museums believe that the retention of the
remains is needed both for research purposes and for meeting their patrons’
general expectation of authenticity.578 Scientists, understandably, also place
high values on research, which they claim will benefit all humanity, including
both traditional and nontraditional communities.579
Another example that illustrates well the tension between access
571 Rebecca Tsosie, ‘Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural
Values’ (1999) 31 Arizona State LJ 583, 640.
572 Posey (n 474 above) 214.
573 Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 178.
574 On the effort by a young Inuit man and his tribe to rebury the human remains of his father displayed
in the American Museum of Natural History in New York, see Kenn Harper, Give Me My Father’s Body: The
Life of Minik the New York Eskimo (Steerforth Press 2000).
575 Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 162–63.
576 Vicki Quade, ‘Who Owns the Past?: How Native American Indian Lawyers Fight for Their Ancestors’
Remains and Memories’ (Winter 1989–1990) Human Rights 24, 29.
577 Harding (n 562 above) 765.
578 Gerstenblith (n 499 above) 162–63.
579 Merryman (n 550 above) 359.
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and control concerns the potentially destructive practices of some traditional
communities—such as the Zunis’ treatment of their Ahayu:da and the Igbo
people’s neglect of their mbaris. Ahayu:da, the Zuni War Gods, ‘are carved
wooden figures which are left in specific places in the mountains for ritual
purposes’.580 As Professor Harding noted, ‘the most respectful treatment [of
these War Gods may be] destruction or neglect’.581 Removing them is therefore not only considered theft and sacrilege, but may rob the War Gods of
their powers.582 Putting these statues in a museum also would deeply disturb
the Zunis, and perhaps other traditional communities, creating cultural discomfort, psychological distress and even spiritual harm. As Professor Harding
explained:
Violating the wishes and needs of Native American tribes with respect to their cultural property neither helps the non-Indian population understand Indian cultures nor assists in creating a sense of
connection. This notion of a common heritage [as embraced by
many museums] is at best an amorphous idea and at its worst an excuse to impose a museum-going culture on an often not-so-receptive Indian population. It is more often than not an easy excuse to put
our own Western educational, scientific, and artistic demands over
and above the interests and integrity of another culture.… Our common heritage is, if anything, our ability to appreciate the beauty
and integrity of another culture and so it should be with an eye on
preserving cultural integrity that we go about understanding and
dealing with cultural property.583

Equally problematic is the seemingly counterintuitive practice of the
Igbo people in Nigeria: they developed artfully created structures but ignored,
and sometimes destroyed, them after completing their creations. Many conservationists are likely to find their practice shocking, partly because of the
aesthetic appeal of the mbaris and partly because of the wasteful nature of
the Igbo practice. Some well-intentioned ones may even offer to ‘rescue’ and
‘protect’ these mbaris—perhaps by relocating them to a museum for public
display. However, as Professor Harding explained:
Indigenous peoples … tend to place greater emphasis on intangibles and process.… The Igbo intentionally destroy or neglect their
artfully created structures to ensure the vitality of the urge to recreate: ‘The purposeful neglect of the painstakingly and devoutly
580 Harding (n 562 above) 746 fn. 118.
581 ibid 771.
582 ibid 746 fn. 118.
583 ibid 769.
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accomplished mbari houses with all their art objects in them as
soon as the primary mandate of their creation has been served,
provides a significant insight into the Igbo aesthetic value as process
rather than product. Process is motion while product is rest. When
the product is preserved or venerated, the impulse to repeat the
process is compromised.’584

Indeed, their practice is quite different from the approach taken by
nontraditional communities, which have a tendency to collect, or even hoard,
cultural objects. As Professor Harding explained further:
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Collecting nations choose to reify the objects themselves, placing
them in hermetically sealed display cases, whereas in many instances, source nations and indigenous peoples desire to preserve the
spirit of the object over the object itself. Often the destruction, neglect, or seclusion of the object is, in fact, central to the preservation of the spirit, as is the case with the mbari house of the Igbo and
the Zuni War Gods.585

Finally, commentators have expressed concern that greater protection—in the form of property rights, perhaps—would reduce access to traditional materials. Such concerns are unlikely to be justified, except in cases
where the protective regime includes in situ protection that restricts access of
the communities to a plant or a site. As Dennis Karjala noted:
The patent may … mean that the price everywhere is higher than
it would be were the product available without patent protection.
It remains a fair question, however, whether the improved product
would exist at all but for the patent incentive. We must bear in mind
that no one is forced to buy the new product. Everyone is free to
continue using whatever he or she has used in the past. Those who
do choose to buy patented seed, for example, presumably believe
that the higher seed cost is more than compensated by the beneficial improvements brought about by the newer product.586

Although Professor Karjala focused on patents, his arguments apply
equally well to other forms of intellectual property or sui generis rights. As he
concluded, ‘The harmful influences of western life style for indigenous cultures are serious and real. Unfortunately, they will not be ameliorated by what
would inevitably be minor adjustments to patent law in western countries or
584 Harding (n 473 above) 309–10.
585 ibid 312.
586 Dennis S Karjala, ‘Biotechnology Patents and Indigenous Peoples’ in Krattiger et al (n 537 above) 1440
(emphasis added).
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in locales of traditional cultures.’587
Theory, however, sometimes differs from practice. For instance, the
issued patents and plant variety protection certificates may be overbroad and
therefore may cover TK that should be considered unprotectable prior art. In
the United States and other developed countries, there have been wide and
intense discussions about the poor quality of the patent examination process.
There have also been successful challenges by traditional communities and
indigenous groups to patents that have been wrongfully issued to preexisting
TK.588 Indeed, because of a lack of documentation for TK and the diﬃculty
in determining whether an invention has used such pre-existing knowledge,
commentators have proposed to introduce a disclosure requirement in the
patent application procedure.
By expanding rights and protecting them aggressively, the intellectual
property system sometimes may also lead to unintended consequences that
can affect the ability by traditional communities to exploit their knowledge
and practices. For example, commentators have noted the confusion among
US customs oﬃcials over whether it is legal for Mexican farmers to import into
the United States naturally grown yellow beans that have been native to Mexico since perhaps the time of the Aztecs.589 Such confusion, which has resulted
in significantly reduced bean exports from Mexico to the United States,590 was
caused by the issuance of a patent and plant variety protection certificate to
the Enola variety of yellow beans that originated from Mexico.
To be certain, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between the patented beans
and the naturally grown variety. It is also worth pointing out that the patent
in the Enola beans has since been revoked.591 Thus, technically, it is not the
protective regime per se that caused the problem, but rather the failed or
improper implementation of that regime. However, from the standpoint of
traditional communities, this type of situation would not have occurred had
intellectual property rights not been aggressively protected in the first place.
To them, the abuse was an inevitable result of the continuous and ill-advised
expansion and overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights.
587 ibid 1442.
588 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (n 462 above) 75–79.
589 Finger (n 493 above) 23–24.
590 Gillian N Rattray, ‘The Enola Bean Patent Controversy: Biopiracy, Novelty and Fish-and-Chips’ [2002]
Duke L & Technology Rev 0008.
591 ETC Group, ‘Hollow Victory: Enola Bean Patent Smashed at Last (Maybe)’ (30 April 2008) <http://www.
etcgroup.org/content/hollow-victory-enola-bean-patent-smashed-last-maybe> accessed 4 May 2014.
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Commentators have widely documented the growing problems of biopiracy and the continuous push for stronger intellectual property protection,
which ranges from heightened protection through the TRIPS Agreement to
additional safeguards through the recently established bilateral and regional
agreements. As a result, traditional communities and developing countries are
eager to use the protection of intangible cultural heritage to fight back. As
Antony Taubman noted, ‘in practice, the impulse towards strengthened protection of TK originates from a sense that [intellectual property] rights have
been used to misappropriate material that might otherwise have fallen into
the public domain’.592
Although traditional communities and developing countries understand the need to reduce biopiracy and the continued pressure to expand
intellectual property rights, some of them may not have any overarching objectives other than to resist the continuing push for stronger protection by
nontraditional communities and developed countries. As Professor Harding
observed, ‘at least one individual has expressed a sentiment about repatriation that is likely common among Native Americans: “Our dream is to pull a
U-Haul up and take back as much as we can.”’593 This comment captured very
well the fight-back mentality of many traditional communities and developing
countries. To them, the new international framework for the protection of
intangible cultural heritage is not just a shield to protect themselves, but also
a sword to enable them to recapture what they have lost under the current
unfair system.594
To be certain, the wide use of resistance is likely to stifle international cooperation and result in greater isolation. However, it is understandable
why these communities want to fight back through resistance—as compared
to, say, cooperation. There has been growing mistrust between developed
and developing countries as well as between traditional and nontraditional
communities about the willingness and ability of the current legal regime to
protect intangible cultural heritage.
Moreover, the push for stronger protection for intangible cultural
heritage would provide the needed ‘bargaining chips’ to ward off the push by
592 Taubman (n 520 above) 543.
593 Harding (n 530 above) 515.
594 Dutfield (n 507 above) 496; WIPO (n 469 above) 13.
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developed countries for stronger intellectual property protection. As Robert
Sherwood recounted his exchange with a Brazilian diplomat:
I recall the diplomat in Buenos Aires who said in a public forum that
Argentina must withhold the intellectual property chip because
Argentina has few others to play into the international trade negotiations game. He speaks for many other developing country trade negotiators. I later suggested to him, privately, that more might
be achieved for the Argentine trade account if robust intellectual
property were installed immediately. The result could well be that
more Argentine producers and farmers would upgrade their products, crops and animals and become more competitive internationally. Instead, if they wait for eventual trade negotiation success,
they might lower a European tariff a few notches, if that, but the
gain would be narrow and selective, rather than sweeping across
the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. He readily
agreed, but insisted that the chip must be withheld to give his country something with which to bargain.595

This encounter shows that developing countries may not necessarily
want to request protection in those areas, but they choose to do so because
they fear that they would not have any bargaining chips left for future negotiations. The same can be said of traditional communities. Like many developing
countries, these communities remain frustrated by the existing system, and
some of them have become increasingly desperate. As Suzan Harjo, the former head of the National Congress of American Indians, put it poignantly, ‘[T]
hey have stolen our land, water, our dead relatives, the stuff we are buried
with, our culture, even our shoes. There’s little left that’s tangible. Now they’re
taking what’s intangible.’596

CONCLUSION
The stakeholders in the debate on intangible cultural heritage want
to achieve many different objectives. A deeper understanding of these objectives would certainly help us better appreciate the stakes involved in the debate and the rich variety of proposals advanced by the relevant stakeholders.
Such an understanding would provide important clues on how to design a new
framework to protect intangible cultural heritage. It would also provide important information about the various competing interests among indigenous
peoples and within traditional communities as well as the potential challenges
595 Robert M Sherwood, ‘Some Things Cannot Be Legislated’ (2002) 10 Cardozo J Intl & Comparative L 37,
39.
596 Farley (n 479 above) 12.
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to achieving international consensus on the protection of these interests.
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In reviewing the eight underlying objectives discussed in this article, it
is important to recognize that these objectives are not always mutually exclusive, and advocates of strong protection for intangible cultural heritage often
combine different objectives to craft their proposals. Nevertheless, some of
these objectives may overlap or conflict with each other, while the others may
affect only a minority of the stakeholders. Thus, a better and deeper understanding of these objectives would help us anticipate the political dynamics
surrounding the negotiations in this emerging area.
In the near future, achieving consensus is likely to remain a challenge.
If the new international framework for the protection of intangible cultural heritage is defined too narrowly—with an exclusive focus on selected objectives,
perhaps—this framework is unlikely to have enough buy-in from the non-beneficiaries. This is not uncommon in conventions that seek to protect cultural
heritage: one only has to consider the membership of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which is made up of mostly
source nations.597
However, if the framework is defined too broadly—to the point that
it encompasses all the different objectives, or at least most of them—the
framework’s vague and aspirational language may ultimately undermine its
effectiveness. A case in point is the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This convention
is more ‘aspirational ... than obligatory’, and its drafters seemed to be more
interested in providing a platform for nurturing a long-term dialogue than
achieving short-term results.598
It took more than 13 years to finalize the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, despite meeting for close to a decade and
a half, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore only began recently to
submit draft treaty texts to the WIPO General Assembly for consideration. It is
therefore likely to take some time before a new international framework can
be established to offer concrete protection to intangible cultural heritage. As
new players and issues emerge, the policy debate in this area will likely become even more complex.
597 Michael L Dutra, ‘Sir, How Much Is That Ming Vase in the Window?: Protecting Cultural Relics in the
People’s Republic of China’ (2004) 5 Asian-Pacific L & Policy J 62, 77.
598 Mezey (n 527 above) 2013.
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